

**2017 NY Slip Op 00125**

**Lisa Goldstein, Plaintiff-Appellant-  
Respondent,**

**v.**

**Orensanz Events LLC, et al.,  
Defendants-Respondents-Appellants.**

**2707  
651706/14**

**Appellate Division of the Supreme  
Court of the State of New York**

**Decided on January 10, 2017**

Andrias, J.P., Moskowitz, Kapnick, Webber,  
Kahn, JJ.

Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, New  
York (Lauren Isaacoff of counsel), for  
appellant-respondent.

Law Office of Richard A. Altman, New  
York (Richard A. Altman of counsel), for  
respondents-appellants.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County  
(Robert R. Reed, J.), entered June 30, 2015,  
which, insofar as appealed from as limited by  
the briefs, granted defendants' motion for  
summary judgment dismissing the complaint,  
and denied their motion for summary  
judgment on the counterclaim for attorney's  
fees and costs, unanimously modified, on the  
law, to deny the motion for summary  
judgment dismissing the complaint, and  
otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff seeks to recover consequential  
damages allegedly incurred when she was  
forced to find a new wedding venue on short  
notice after the venue she initially booked was  
closed pursuant to a vacate order issued by  
the New York City Department of Buildings  
upon a finding that the building was  
structurally unstable. Defendants, the  
manager and the owner of the building,  
moved for summary judgment citing the force

majeure clause in the site rental agreement,  
which provides that if the event must be  
canceled because of "an order of the Federal,  
State, or City government or for any reason  
beyond Owner's control," the client's sole  
remedy is either another date for the event or  
a refund. Plaintiff argues that the issuance of  
the vacate order and the ensuing cancellation  
were within defendants' control.

While, as the motion court found, the  
clause as written applies to any cancellation  
pursuant to a government order regardless of  
whether the order was unforeseeable or  
outside defendants' control, it must be  
interpreted in light of the purpose of force  
majeure clauses, "to limit damages ... where  
the reasonable expectation of the parties and  
the performance of the contract have been  
frustrated by circumstances beyond the  
control of the parties" (*United Equities Co. v  
First Natl. City Bank*, 52 AD2d 154, 157 [1st  
Dept 1976], *affd* 41 NY2d 1032 [1977]; *see  
Macalloy Corp. v Metallurg, Inc.*, 284 AD2d  
227 [1st Dept 2001]; *Team Mktg. USA Corp.  
v Power Pact, LLC*, 41 AD3d 939, 942-943  
[3d Dept 2007]; *Phibro Energy, Inc. v  
Empresa de Polimeros de Sines Sarl*, 720 F  
Supp 312, 318-320 [SD NY 1989]). Thus, the  
clause must be interpreted as if it included an  
express requirement of unforeseeability or  
lack of control. The vacate order's citation to  
defendants' failure to maintain the building  
and the engineer's letter citing overcrowding  
as a possible cause for the structural failure  
present issues of fact whether the failure was  
foreseeable or within defendants' control and  
therefore whether the force majeure clause  
applies in this case.

Accordingly, defendants have not  
complied with their discovery obligations,  
and further discovery is necessary to  
determine the cause of the structural failure  
(*see* CPLR 3212[f]).

In view of the foregoing, we need not  
reach the issue of defendants' entitlement to  
attorneys' fees and costs.

We have considered defendants' remaining arguments for affirmative relief and find them unavailing.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION  
AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT,  
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST  
DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JANUARY 10, 2017

CLERK